

# “A wider variant of AES” Rijndael-256 and RISC-V Crypto ISA

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## NIST SP 800-197 (Initial Preliminary Draft)

# PRE-DRAFT Call for Comments: NIST Proposes to Standardize a Wider Variant of AES



**Date Published:** December 23, 2024

**Comments Due:** June 25, 2025

**Email Comments to:** [ciphermodes@nist.gov](mailto:ciphermodes@nist.gov)

### Author(s)

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### Announcement

The [Advanced Encryption Standard](#) (AES) specifies a subset of the [Rijndael block cipher family](#) with 128-bit blocks that was submitted to the NIST [AES development](#) effort. While this block size remains sufficient for many applications, the increasing demand for processing large volumes of data highlights the potential advantages of a larger block size. This need was pointed out in the [public comments](#) received for (Special Publication) SP 800-38A, acknowledged in NIST Internal Report 8459, and further reinforced during two NIST public workshops on block cipher modes of operation.

In August 2024, NIST [indicated its interest](#) in vetting another Rijndael variant for approval: Rijndael with 256-bit blocks (i.e., Rijndael-256) with a single key size of 256-bits. NIST plans to develop a draft standard for Rijndael-256 over the next year and requests public comments on this plan by **June 25, 2025**, especially for the following categories:

- **Security analysis**, including any new cryptanalytic results related to the 256-bit block size
- **Performance and efficiency**, particularly in environments with hardware support for AES

### DOCUMENTATION

**Publication:**

No Download Available

**Supplemental Material:**

None available

**Document History:**

12/23/24: SP 800-197 (Draft)

### TOPICS

**Security and Privacy**


[encryption](#)

**Activities and Products**

[standards development](#)

# Rijndael-256 Specs & Implementation

- The original 1990s Rijndael proposal allowed block size and key to independently be { 128, 192, 256 } bits.
- The non-AES variants were largely ignored for over 20 years. Appendices B.3 and C of the Rijndael book (👉) has some test vectors and reference code for them.
- I used these to verify that my RISC-V implementation with current **Zvkned** should be correct. See:  
<https://github.com/mjosaarinen/rij256-rv/>



# Rijndael-256 vs AES-256

- **Rijndael-256 has 14 rounds** and  $14+1=15$  round keys (same as AES-256).
- **The key schedule of Rijndael-256 is the same as AES-256**, except that more round constants are used. For a given key  $K$ , AES-256 round keys 1..14 match Rijndael-256 expanded key material for rounds 1..7.

Only Rijndael-256 ShiftRows() differs from  $2 \times$  AES parallel round steps:

- **SubBytes()**: 32 S-Box byte substitutions, independent of each others.
- **ShiftRows()**: 4 rows of 8 bytes, rotated left by  $\{ 0, 1, 3, 4 \}$  positions.
- **MixColumns()**: 8 columns (32-bit chunks). Same linear operation as in AES.
- **AddRoundKey()**: A 32 byte-XOR with the round keys.

### 34.3.6. vaeskf2.vi


#### Synopsis

Vector AES-256 Forward KeySchedule generation

#### Mnemonic

vaeskf2.vi vd, vs2, uimm

#### Encoding



#### Reserved Encodings

- SEW is any value other than 32

*This is fine for Rijndael-256 except that we now need more round constants:*

The round number, which ranges from 2 to 14, comes from `uimm[3:0]`; `uimm[4]` is ignored. The out-of-range `uimm[3:0]` values of 0-1 and 15 are mapped to in-range values by inverting `uimm[3]`. Thus, 0-1 maps to 8-9, and 15 maps to 7.

# Only ShiftRows() mixes 128-bit “lanes” (1)

( 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 )	<u>Input: Bytes 0,1,2,..., 31.</u>
( 1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 )	<i>Bytes are ordered “column first!”</i>
( 2 6 10 14 18 22 26 30 )	
( 3 7 11 15 19 23 27 31 )	
( 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 )	<u>Rijndael-256 ShiftRows():</u>
( 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 1 )	<i>Entire row rotated left by 1</i>
( 14 18 22 26 30 2 6 10 )	<i>Entire row rotated left by 3</i>
( 19 23 27 31 3 7 11 15 )	<i>Entire row rotated left by 4</i>

# Only ShiftRows() mixes 128-bit “lanes” (2)

( 0 4 8 12   <b>16</b> 20 24 28 )	<u>2 × parallel AES ShiftRows():</u>
( 5 9 13 <b>1</b>   21 25 29 <b>17</b> )	<i>Half-rows rotated left by 1</i>
( 10 14 <b>2</b> 6   26 30 <b>18</b> 22 )	<i>Half-rows rotated left by 2</i>
( 15 <b>3</b> 7 11   31 <b>19</b> 23 27 )	<i>Half-rows rotated left by 3</i>
( 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 )	<u>Rijndael-256 ShiftRows():</u>
( 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 <b>1</b> )	<i>Entire row rotated left by 1</i>
( 14 18 22 26 30 <b>2</b> 6 10 )	<i>Entire row rotated left by 3</i>
( 19 23 27 31 <b>3</b> 7 11 15 )	<i>Entire row rotated left by 4</i>

# Zvkned: Each round vrgather.vv and vaes\_\_.vv

- Before each round, permute 32 bytes with vrgather.vv, indices:  

```
{ 0, 17, 22, 23, 4, 5, 26, 27, 8, 9, 14, 31, 12, 13, 18, 19,  
 16, 1, 6, 7, 20, 21, 10, 11, 24, 25, 30, 15, 28, 29, 2, 3 };
```
- “Undoes”  $2 \times$  parallel AES-128 ShiftRows(), then the Rijndael-256 ShiftRows.
- **vaesem.vv: SubBytes() ➤ ShiftRows() ➤ MixColumns() ➤ AddRoundKey()**
- I’ve implemented and tested this; having the same round keys in encryption and decryption still works (no need to shuffle round keys.)

<https://github.com/mjosaarinen/rij256-rv/>



# Annoying SEW toggle required each round

vsetvli	zero, a4, e8, m1, ta, ma	# AVL=32, SEW=8
vrgather.vv	v25, v24, v8	# shuffle bytes
vsetivli	zero, 8, e32, m1, ta, ma	# AVL=8, SEW=32
vaesem.vv	v25, v10	# 2×128b AES

vsetvli	zero, a4, e8, m1, ta, ma	# AVL=32, SEW=8
vrgather.vv	v24, v25, v8	# shuffle bytes
vsetivli	zero, 8, e32, m1, ta, ma	# AVL=8, SEW=32
vaesem.vv	v24, v11	# 2×128b AES

# Encrypt and decrypt 1024 bytes this way

=== AES-256 ===

aes256\_exp\_key(): ins= 58 cyc= ?

aes256\_enc(1024): ins= 775 cyc= ?

aes256\_dec(1024): ins= 775 cyc= ?

=== Rijndael-256 ===

rij256\_exp\_key(): ins= 123 cyc= ?

rij256\_enc(1024): ins= 2059 cyc= ?

rij256\_dec(1024): ins= 2059 cyc= ?

# This is already “constant time”

The `vrgather.vv` instruction is “half constant-time” in the sense that under `Zvkt` the latency does not depend on the data being permuted.

However latency can depend on the permutation, but that is constant.

## 34.2.15.12. permute

In the `.vv` and `.xv` forms of the `vrgather[ei16]` instructions, the values in `vs1` and `rs1` are used for control and therefore are exempt from DIEL.

- `vrgather.v[ivx]`
- `vrgatherei16.vv`

# Some Proposals for Consideration

1. With SEW=64 the AES instructions become Rijndael-256 Instructions.

`vaesef.[vv,vs]`, `vaesem.[vv,vs]`, `vaesdf.[vv,vs]`, `vaesdm.[vv,vs]`, `vaeskf2.vi`

2. Allow the same AES instructions with SEW=8, eliminating SEW toggling.

3. Modify `vaeskf2.vi` definition to support additional round constants.

4. Insert a hint into `vrgather` instruction for the special Rijndael-256 encryption and decryption permutations and “hardwire” them.